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atropinized eyes, and in part upon the unfavorable or equivocal results of experiments to test the effect of altering the accommodation by means of lenses. Special experiments upon the general function of the accommodation in the perception of the third dimension lead to the same adverse conclusion.

(3) Binocular vision increases the number of predominants seen in certain cases and diminishes them in others. Monocular vision yields, on the whole, greater uniformity.

(4) Increasing the distance of the figure from the eye favors the seeing of the concave form of a perspective.

(5) As to illumination, the distribution of light and shade by the throwing of cast-shadows is of course highly effective. A further fact of much importance and one carefully investigated is that white lines on black tend strongly to advance into the foreground. In an attempt to equate the distances of black and white rods the average difference between them was one thirty-eighth of the standard. The superior brightness and clearness of the white is probably the determining factor.

The final chapter of the book is devoted to a recapitulation and to a comprehensive survey and discussion of theories. As the reader might readily predict, it is the psychophysical, as against the psychological, theory that is recommended as adequate to meet the case of these illusions of reversible perspective. No precise formulation of the theory is proposed, somewhat loose generalities comporting better with the present state of our knowledge.

It is a pity that a volume with the merits of this one should have certain conspicuous defects serious enough to keep it from being more generally read. To be sure, the cuts with which both the historical and the experimental sections are plentifully supplied are most excellent. But the typography is wretched, as the author himself admits and laments. And, what really furnishes the forbidding aspect of the book, occasional sections and chapters are written with inexcusable obscurity both of language and of presentation. One finds everywhere a perverse tendency toward endlessness of subdivision and toward a plethora of adjectival characterization. This, coupled with an exasperating cloudiness of style into which the author is led by the exigencies of a compensating condensation, makes the reading of the volume anything but easy. Frequent recapitulations partially redeem these defects, and the attention is occasionally caught by suggestive criticisms, side-comments and discussions.

An unusually full index closes the volume.

A. H. PIERCE.

SMITH COLLEGE.

Psychologie und Pathologie der Vorstellung. Beiträge zur Grundlegung der Aesthetik. RICHARD WALLASCHEK. Leipzig: Barth. 1905. Pp. x + 323.

This work purports to be a partial prolegomenon to esthetic theory; a finished prolegomenon would, the preface says, have to include further an investigation of sensation, feeling and judgment similar to the one

here made of *Vorstellung*. After reading the work, however, the reviewer can not avoid the conclusion that it is really an attempt to prove certain theories by recourse to clinical evidence. What is given is in no wise a contribution to any branch of psychology, but rather a highly interesting rearrangement of long-known material suited to lend a certain probability to one or two 'principles' of esthetics, especially to the hypothesis of the complete independence of feeling, thinking and reacting, and *a fortiori* to the theory of the fundamental identity of artistic enjoyment, secondary sensations and hypnotic states.

The non-rational character of esthetic states is held to be proved by the absolutely variable and indeterminable nature of the *Vorstellungen* induced by feelings (p. 144). There is, accordingly, no causal connection between *what* we have 'in fantasy' while we are feeling in a particular way and the character of this feeling itself. But this fact—if it be one—is nowhere clearly distinguished from the very different one that certain things induce certain sorts of feeling. The writer is constantly confusing the two, although his last word is that 'in the long run not everything can be held to be beautiful' (p. 308), thus indicating the possibility and necessity of objective esthetic science.

Another hopeless difficulty for the reader lies in the constant shifting of standpoints. At one time we are told what associations some people have with certain feelings. Then again, how one must proceed in order to produce esthetic enjoyment in others, once again—and this very commonly—the pedagogical significance of facts brought to light by pathological and normal cases of association, chromesthesia, hypnotism, etc. In one instance the insertion of a pedagogical digression is intolerable; the writer fills twenty pages with a theory of teaching piano-playing! (pp. 92 ff.). One can never tell just what the book is trying to show.

Unfortunately, the most interesting things noted have nothing to do with establishing a theory of esthetics. For instance, the origin and function of secondary sensations (pp. 187–192) and the significance of dream-types (pp. 258 ff.) are highly readable topics. The author attempts to explain all instinctive activity as an effect of secondary sensations. Speaking of cattle which avoid poisonous weeds, he says: 'If looking at or smelling of a weed induces at once secondary taste-sensations of the same kind and effect as induced by the actual eating of the weed, then we can understand the cow's abstinence' (p. 191). Quite true, the reader will say; but this view does not eliminate the problem of the origin of this strange interactivity, as Wallaschek supposes it does when he says that the whole theory of heredity can now be dispensed with! One might ask, indeed, what sort of secondary sensations account for the migratory instincts of birds, etc. The writer devotes a page and a quarter (with one illustration) to put all evolutionary biology out-of-doors! With regard to dreams, we are told that secondary sensations here gain the control of our experience (p. 258), and that absolutely all judgment is, therefore, lacking in sleep-experiences (p. 259). This latter statement can not be taken scientifically, but only in the popular sense of the word 'judgment.' The supposedly prophetic character of dreams is explained

as the working of secondary sensations which in sleep induce associations that otherwise would be swamped by voluntarily controlled attention; hence the various sorts of dreams we have are indices of certain typical experiences (p. 260). Whether Wallaschek's interpretations of special types of dream adventures are correct, the physiologist must help us to determine; at all events, they are ingenious.

The writer connects esthetic pleasure with dream-experiences, both being, as he thinks, cases of non-rational domination of secondary sensations. So, he says, it is a fundamental principle that music ought to be enjoyed just as a dream is (p. 268). The subjective freedom is what constitutes the indescribable pleasure of both dreaming and listening to music. Perhaps nowhere else does the purely individual, non-scientific character of the whole book stick out so clearly as here; in calling esthetic enjoyment 'subjectively free' in the way dreams are, the writer brings in the most harmful equivocations, inasmuch as *what* we are free from in each case is utterly different. Dreaming is abject slavery to physiological conditions (roughly speaking), whereas 'roaming in fantasy' while hearing music is a procedure most emphatically under the control of the will to no inconsiderable extent. Other equally great differences may readily be noted, too. Wallaschek, however, repeats in another connection his conviction that the effect of esthetically experienced things upon us is essentially hypnotic (p. 306). This is, of course, the consistent outcome of his absolute divorcement of emotion and thinking. The implication of all this is plainly that, whatever may induce a particular feeling, there is involved at no point an essential reference to an object; feelings can be, must be, associated independently of all association of things connected somehow with these feelings. To the psychologist and logician, it is clear that Wallaschek is once more speaking of 'objects' in the popular sense, just as he does of 'judgment.' The critic must protest, though, that even infinite (absolutely non-repeating) variation in 'associations' would never even make it probable that *no* reference to objects is implicated in esthetic feeling. Another consistent statement is that artistic genius is essentially frenzy, an absolutely pathological rendition of inner experiences (p. 297); outward self-control does not change the deepest nature of the genius's experiences at all. The difference between genius and madman lies in the possession by the former of 'normal consciousness' and in its absence in the latter. Incidentally, it might be noted that the arguments based upon statistics about the geographical distribution of the insane (p. 257) are wholly illogical. Again, incidentally, the epistemological conclusions about the character of space and time as drawn from observations of narcosis are almost humorous (p. 248).

In spite of the unfavorable impression of the work which the above notes will convey, there is, nevertheless, much to be said on the other side. The author is plainly an esthete in blood and bone, individualistic to the point of enthusiasm; yet the facts brought together here signify a vast command of literature and an exceptionally high order of expository ability. The readability of the book is unhappily out of all proportion to its scientific value. As a reference-work for beginners in psychology

it might well find approval by reason of its admirable bibliography of pathological cases and the vast number of detailed reports on such. But there is not a single statement made, not a single conjecture advanced, which gives hope of solving any of the problems which the majority of students regard as the really fundamental ones in esthetics. The work itself is an esthetic production, not a scientific one; a strange mass of perfectly true facts clustered in a way more or less irrelevant to psychological interests.

WALTER B. PITKIN.

BERLIN, GERMANY.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK. Band 126, Heft 2, July, 1905. *Der Wandel in Schillers Weltanschauung* (pp. 113-139): H. CLASSEN. - Insufficient attention has been given to the wide divergence of Schiller's earlier, Platonic, mystic, theosophic beliefs from the introspective and humanistic doctrines that held him later. To the end his philosophy was unsettled. *Die neuen Bände der akademischen Kant-Ausgabe* (pp. 140-167): K. VORLÄNDER. - Notes on the revelations of Kant's personality in his latest letters. Sundry comments on the order and on other special features of the first four volumes of the edition. *Identität und Gleichheit mit Beiträgen zur Lehre von den Mannigfaltigkeiten* (pp. 168-188): K. GEISSLER. - From a study of the use of the terms, identity and equality in mathematics, the conclusion is drawn that it is at least doubtful whether we can for logical purposes use the terms as significant elements apart from specific contexts, their meanings varying so that we can not use the terms absolutely. *Ueber den Text der Lucasschen Biographie Spinozas* (pp. 189-208): J. FREUDENTHAL. - The editor replies to v. Dunin-Borkowski's criticisms. *Recenzionen* (pp. 209-226): Guido Villa, *Einleitung in die Psychologie der Gegenwart*: STÖRRING. D. Hume, *Eine Untersuchung über die menschliche Vernunft*. Deutsch von C. Nathanson: H. BROMSE. J. Freudenthal, *Spinoza, Sein Leben und seine Lehre*: LÜLMANN. J. Baumann, *Deutsche und ausserdeutsche Philosophie der letzten Jahrzehnte dargestellt und beurteilt*: K. VORLÄNDER. L. Goldstein, *Moses Mendelssohn und die deutsche Ästhetik*: A. TUMARKIN. *Entgegnung. Selbstanzeige, Notizen. Neu eingegangene Schriften*. Aus Zeitschriften.

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